Financial Sector Development in the Pacific Rim, East Asia Seminar on Economics, Volume 18 by Peter Nicholas Kriz
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: Financial Sector Development in the Pacific Rim, East Asia 
Seminar on Economics, Volume 18 
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN:  0-226-38684-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_07-2
Conference Date: June 22-24, 2007
Publication Date: February 2009
Chapter Title:  Comment on "Hong Kong and Shanghai: Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow"
Chapter Author:  Peter Nicholas Kriz 
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0408
Chapter pages in book: (42 - 50)Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited. 2007. Monthly statistics. http://
www.hkex.com.hk/futures/statistics/index_MR.htm.
Hong Kong SAR Government. 2005. Hong Kong annual yearbook, 2005. Hong
Kong: Hong Kong SAR Government.
Kwong, Robin, Sundeep Tucker, and Anuj Gangahar. 2007. China on course to
lead world IPO league. Financial Times, July 5.
Pastor, Lubos, and Robert F. Stambaugh. 2003. Liquidity risk and expected stock
returns. Journal of Political Economy 111 (June): 642–85.
Schenk, Catherine. 2003. Banking crises and the evolution of the regulatory frame-
work in Hong Kong 1945–70. Australian Economic History Review43(2): 140–54.
World Federation of Exchanges. 2007. Monthly statistics.http://www.worldexchanges
.org/WFE/home.asp?menu 436&document 4822.
Comment Peter Nicholas Kriz
Introduction
In a rather provocative chapter, McCauley and Chan use a combination
of descriptive statistics and counterfactual estimations to persuade readers
of two facts regarding Hong Kong’s fate as international ﬁnancial center.
One, Hong Kong possesses marked leadership over Shanghai in interna-
tional banking, foreign exchange, derivatives, capital market development,
and internationalization, and these current advantages are of importance
for how one should consider their futures. Two, recent trends portend a
growing rather than diminishing gap in favor of Hong Kong with respect
to the relative ﬁnancial strength of these two cities. In light of their ﬁnd-
ings, the authors conclude that rather than weaken in the face of China’s
renaissance, Hong Kong’s position as the de facto center of international
ﬁnance in China should strengthen, and its ﬁnancial leadership over
Shanghai be retained.
My comments on this chapter are organized into three sections. First, I
ask a number of questions issues related to Hong Kong’s strength relative
to Shanghai. In doing so, I provide some needed context to the interpreta-
tion of current data and future projections. Second, I critically discuss the
main analytical feature of the chapter, the counterfactual estimation. I ap-
proach their ﬁndings from four theoretical considerations, each of which
oﬀers a diﬀerent characterization of future expectations and suggests a
more holistic perspective on the counterfactuals. Finally, I conclude with a
few parting thoughts on economic research on China and other emerging
markets.
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Peter Nicholas Kriz is an assistant professor of economics at Singapore Management Uni-
versity.Hong Kong’s Relative Strength: A Fait Accompli?
To gain a robust appreciation of Hong Kong versus Shanghai’s ﬁnancial
past, present, and future, one must deconstruct the myriad of facts and ﬁg-
ures that are currently available. I suggest a three-step approach. First, de-
velop an understanding of the economic and political processes that explain
the recent past. Next, evaluate the current state of aﬀairs based not only on
the past processes but also on current forces and expectations of the future.
Finally, make projections into the future based on both an understanding 
of processes that drive the present and also on how those processes might
change going forward. Without a thorough approach to uncover the fun-
damental political economy that has produced the remarkable dynamism
of China this past century, it would be near impossible to provide plausible
projections as to the ﬁnancial future of Hong Kong versus Shanghai.
To frame this analysis, I ask three sets of questions:
• One, what explains Hong Kong’s current edge over Shanghai in inter-
national ﬁnance? What are the historical processes that explain the de-
velopment of ﬁnance in Hong Kong and Shanghai?
• Two, is the current nature of Hong Kong ﬁnance diﬀerent from that of
Shanghai? Are there obstacles preventing Shanghai from matching
the services oﬀered by Hong Kong to international capital? How
would Hong Kong’s leadership be threatened by the developing ren-
aissance of Shanghai ﬁnance?
• Three, what should the monetary integration of China imply for the fu-
ture of ﬁnance in Hong Kong and Shanghai in both absolute and rela-
tive terms? Will economic development in China raise all boats and
raise them proportionately? Is the penetration of Hong Kong-based ﬁ-
nance into China any diﬀerent from that of Shanghai? If so, how?
What Explains Hong Kong’s Current Edge 
over Shanghai in International Finance?
Unfortunately, the authors do not suﬃciently address the question of
what explains Hong Kong’s relative success. Yes, it is true that Shanghai is
more domestically focused, more closely tied to government bonds, and
has natural leadership in commodities, but the advantages of Hong Kong
are largely the result of historical legacy. For both cities, domestic and in-
ternational political economy have deﬁned their historical evolution.
From 1937 to 1992, excepting brief periods of during the Second World
War and the Chinese civil war, international ﬁnance in Shanghai was eﬀec-
tively shut down. As a communist victory on the mainland became appar-
ent, domestic human capital, technical expertise, and the entire inter-
national ﬁnancial community ﬂed Shanghai, primarily for Hong Kong.
Therefore, by edict, ﬁnance in Shanghai turned wholly public and domes-
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in 1979 bypassed Shanghai for more than a decade. Not until 1992 did in-
ternational ﬁnancial operations resume with the ﬁrst signiﬁcant boom 
in economic activity. From this tumultuous perspective of history, the
phoenixlike rise of Shanghai’s ﬁnancial community has been truly ex-
traordinary and without historical precedent.
In comparison, Hong Kong has been the beneﬁciary of four fortuitous
historical blessings. One, as the seat of British Colonial Empire in East
Asia, Hong Kong was endowed with the legal and institutional frameworks
of the world’s leading capitalist nation. It was also plugged into a global net-
work of the largest players in international ﬁnance and had direct access to
London, then the undisputed ﬁnancial center of the world. Two, Hong
Kong was the regional depository of human capital and technical expertise
in international ﬁnance that poured out of China between 1945 and 1949.
More than merely a technical boost, the immigration siniﬁed Hong Kong’s
human capital and exposure to mainland business networks far more than
it had been under the British. Three, with these networks ﬁrmly in place by
1979, Hong Kong was ideally positioned, geographically and operationally,
to help ﬁnance protoprivate enterprises in the Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) of nearby Cantonese-speaking Guangdong. The proximity of Hong
Kong and the prohibition of international ﬁnance in Shanghai eﬀectively
gave Hong Kong a thirteen-year head start in Shenzhen and with private ﬁ-
nancial dealings with China. As a result, Hong Kong was ideally suited to
handle a large proportion of international capital ﬂows entering China dur-
ing the boom that started in earnest in the early 1990s.
A comparative analysis of their recent ﬁnancial histories suggests that
Hong Kong was handed enormous advantages over Shanghai by history,
by the accident of war and implicitly by design. Only in the past ﬁfteen
years has Shanghai had any opportunity to regain its international stat-
ure. Rather than emphasize Hong Kong’s advantages over Shanghai as a
clear indication of Hong Kong’s inherent superiority, perhaps the authors
should have given more perspective to the distinctive inﬂuences of history.
It would have been interesting to examine in detail the initial years of
Shanghai’s renaissance and its implications for Hong Kong’s future.
Is the Nature of Hong Kong Finance Diﬀerent from That of Shanghai?
The authors also fail to address this question of inherent diﬀerences. Al-
though they do acknowledge that Hong Kong’s ﬁnancial leadership may
be temporal, they do not provide any behavioral or structural insights into
how Hong Kong’s approach to international ﬁnance is any diﬀerent from
that of Shanghai. Understanding any diﬀerences in objectives, constraints,
or culture would be essential in predicting the future success of Hong Kong
in Chinese ﬁnancial development.
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hai from eventually oﬀering equivalent services to international capital as
Hong Kong. Should they in fact exist, they would ultimately be ﬁrst-order
importance. Knowledge of any barriers would aﬀect the relative speed at
which Shanghai closes the gap and whether the gap will ever be closed. Un-
derstanding these obstacles would also help us determine whether the fu-
ture of China will feature one or two centers of international ﬁnance. Per-
haps most important, the existence of obstacles would provide observable
indicators that would help evaluate health of both centers.
To promote the supposition that Hong Kong has something special that
will prevent Shanghai from eventually dominating international ﬁnance in
China, the authors could have provided arguments based on either eco-
nomic or institutional determinants. A short list of factors might include
technical eﬃciency; capacity and economies of scale; human capital; the
commitment of and interactions with big players; better ties to real do-
mestic activity, product innovation and customization; and legal, political,
and social institutions. Without clear determination of the processes driv-
ing Hong Kong’s advantage, it is diﬃcult to rule out that Hong Kong’s ad-
vantages are historical accidents with a ﬁnite lifetime.
What Should Monetary Integration Imply 
for the Future of Finance in Both Cities?
Of course, with China there are two forms of monetary integration: do-
mestic (with Hong Kong) and regional (with Asia). With both, the authors
rightly point out that economic development in China thus far appears to
be raising all boats. However, their analysis essentially extrapolates current
advantages enjoyed by Hong Kong into the future, thereby implying that
both ﬁnancial centers will expand proportionately. Yet it is not likely that
government policy will remain passive on such a fundamental issue as de-
termining the center of international ﬁnance in China. It seems clear that
the combination of global politics and domestic public policy more than
natural economic forces has shaped the ﬁnancial landscape in favor of
Hong Kong. If Beijing does intervene and actively promotes one center
over the other, then current trends may contain little to no predictive power
going forward.
Moreover, it is not altogether obvious that Hong Kong’s economic ad-
vantages will continue nor for how long. The authors understate the in-
credible trends in Shanghai since 1992. They leave unaddressed the ques-
tion of whether the penetration of Hong Kong-based ﬁnance into China 
is any diﬀerent from that of Shanghai. The authors do not explore the 
determinants of ﬁnancial market penetration and expansion nor argue
why Hong Kong might possess special advantages over Shanghai. As the
clear ﬁnancial center of Cantonese-speaking China, it remains to be seen
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advantages it clearly had in Shenzhen and Guangzhou.
Given the absence of any eﬀort to explain the source of Hong Kong’s ad-
vantages over Shanghai or to provide some basis for how one should pre-
dict the future development of international ﬁnance, I am left to conclude
that the authors’ depiction of Hong Kong’s strength relative to Shanghai is
somewhat of a statistical tautology, a fait accompli. That Hong Kong is
clearly ahead of Shanghai in virtually every ﬁnancial category and contin-
ues to leverage its advantages is not particularly interesting nor is it illumi-
nating with respect to future expectations. To provide a more persuasive
analysis, the authors should provide some accounting for how history, po-
litical economy, and market integration will shape the future fortunes of
Shanghai and Hong Kong.
Counterfactual Estimation: Alternative Theoretical Perspectives
In order to estimate the size of China’s international banking position
and the relative share that might be expected of Hong Kong and Shanghai,
the authors adopt the counterfactual estimation methodology of Lane
(2000). They impose the relationship of international banking positions 
to income and economic openness found in Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries on Chinese data.
Throughout, they assume that Hong Kong’s share of China’s external po-
sition remains stable at 40 percent. They ﬁnd that growth rates for China’s
cross-border banking position are expected to quintuple over seven years
to half of gross domestic product (GDP). They conclude that the projec-
tions for Hong Kong suggest that Hong Kong’s strength as a ﬁnancial cen-
ter looks stable.
While it is certainly not unreasonable to expect that Hong Kong will re-
main a great ﬁnancial center for the foreseeable future, there are a number
of theoretical and empirical shortcomings to the authors’ use of counter-
factual estimation. A proper projection would have addressed the deeper
economic and political questions that will determine Hong Kong’s fate.
Rather than bother with the limitations of a quantitative model, I would
have preferred the authors to have laid down a qualitative road map to bet-
ter forecast the fate of Hong Kong.
In the section that follows, I critically discuss McCauley and Chan from
four theoretical considerations: historical legacy, institutions and nonlin-
earities, political economy, and strategic interactions. From each vantage
point, I examine the econometric analysis of the authors and the assump-
tions that underlie its construction. While no single theoretical perspective
owns the market on prognostication, each can contribute to the building of
an analytical framework that can better contextualize future expectations
for Hong Kong and Shanghai.
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As presented, Hong Kong’s share in China’s international banking posi-
tion is tautological: imposed by the authors at the recent (albeit stable)
trend of 40 percent. Yet the current state of international ﬁnance in China
is conditional upon its unique historical legacy. To impose an ad hoc value
to what constitutes the key dependent variable in this discussion seems to
undermine the point of this analysis.
Let’s assume for the time being that the recent share of 40 percent is rep-
resentative of some kind of steady state. If so, it would presume a constancy
of underlying institutional factors. Change these factors and the steady
state itself would change in virtually any economic model. Yet it is clear
that China is in the process of resolving its “liberalization trilemma,” that
is, the challenge that ﬁnancial liberalization imposes upon the macroeco-
nomic policy framework.1 As such, it is fundamentally restructuring its ﬁ-
nancial, legal, and regulatory institutions and has been doing so since
1979. With institutions undergoing fundamental reconstruction, it is dif-
ﬁcult to accept the constant 40 percent assumption assigned to Hong
Kong’s share of China’s international ﬁnance. What we may be witnessing
is simply a local trend that may bear little resemblance to Hong Kong’s
share once the country as a whole has reached its global steady state.
Moreover, once the potential of Shanghai’s ﬁnancial sector is fully un-
locked, the future path of Hong Kong’s share is unlikely to be predictable
based on past dynamics. The relative strengths of these two ﬁnancial giants
will be largely determined by how well each ﬁnancial center can service the
needs of international investors and global demands to participate in the
development of China. The population data in table 1C.1 suggests that de-
velopment and urbanization remain in their early stages. Where it has
taken place has been in areas where Hong Kong has had natural advan-
tages. Whether Hong Kong can continue to lead Shanghai in more neutral
areas remains to be seen, particularly as the latter builds critical mass and
technical know-how and the former loses its institutional advantages.
One solution to these criticisms would be use of a structural rather than
counterfactual model. To properly address the content of this discussion,
one needs a model that can examine how market penetration and global
positioning might unfold under varying characterizations of Hong Kong
and Shanghai. Such a model would be inherently dynamic, whereby struc-
tural and institutional assumptions are nontrivial.
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1. The ﬁnancial liberalization trilemma posits that exchange rate ﬂexibility, openness of
the capital account, and the extent of domestic ﬁnancial institutional development are mutu-
ally determined: once one dimension is chosen, it endogenizes the other two. See Chow and
Kriz (2007) for a complete presentation.Institutions and Nonlinearity
Given the internal dynamism of China, it is would seem essential to look
more closely look at the role of institutions. However, the authors implic-
itly ignore institutions in both their argumentation and in the way in which
the counterfactual estimation is structured. Imposition of data from
OECD countries imposes a stable and advanced level of capitalistic insti-
tutional development onto China. Doing so avoids the messy although im-
portant fact that China has been undergoing a process of fundamentally
reconstructing its institutions from those of Maoist Communism.
One outcome of this form of exogenous imposition is that econometric
ﬁt will likely overpredict strength during early years of weak institutions
and underpredict the same ﬁt in later years of the forecast. I suggest two so-
lutions. One, the authors should capture the eﬀect of evolving institutions.
Doing so would address the issue of nonlinearities presently in their esti-
mations. Two, the authors can ﬁnd data from emerging markets that have
successfully reached an advanced level of ﬁnancial development. The
growth dynamics would be a better model for China than that of countries
whose capital market development has always been at a relatively high and
constant level.
Political Economy
The study of international ﬁnance in China is the study of domestic and
international political economy. As we have noted, the relative ﬁnancial
strength of Hong Kong and Shanghai was heavily shaped by colonization,
war, and Beijing’s own domestic policies. If the past century is any guide,
China’s political economy will continue to evolve. Going forward it would
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Source: China Business World.seem safe to assume that Beijing will continue to heavily inﬂuence the
growth and emphasis of both ﬁnancial centers.
Political prudence dictates that Beijing play Shanghai oﬀ Hong Kong 
in order to avert an asymmetric dominance of one. Although the authors
note the tension between Shanghai and Beijing, they do not oﬀer us any in-
sights into how diﬀerences between Beijing and Shanghai or the ambiva-
lence in Hong Kong toward the rule of Beijing might inﬂuence political
control from Beijing.
The authors also fail to address the possible implications of how Hong
Kong will be treated once the Basic Law ceases to be. Most assuredly, mar-
kets will move in anticipation of signals from Beijing as to its intentions for
Hong Kong. Therefore, by not addressing the question of Beijing’s inten-
tions, the counterfactual estimation implicitly assumes no change in polit-
ical economy going forward. Their analysis assumes further that monetary
integration with Hong Kong will not play a role in Hong Kong and Shang-
hai’s fate as ﬁnancial centers.
A solution to the issue of political economy would be a structural model
that allows for an exogenous mechanism that can shift both shares and com-
position. Such a model would generate a wider range of forecasts and pro-
duce a more robust sense of market share given Beijing. Only then can we
understand how the economic determinants of ﬁnancial sector develop-
ment will interplay with the domestic and international political economy.
Strategic Interactions
The authors present a straightforward discussion that assumes away any
strategic interplay between these two ﬁnancial giants. But presumably
these two cities with their historical claims to fame as great centers of
Asian ﬁnance may have something to say. One would imagine that Shang-
hai will be leveraging its domestic advantages for a greater share of inter-
national ﬁnancial markets. It would be interesting to learn what form that
plan might take. Similarly, it would be interesting to know how Hong Kong
will continue to present itself as the ﬁnancial center for China as Shanghai
continues to scale and the competitive landscape turns to new markets in
China and Asia.
As we alluded to, Beijing will probably have a direct inﬂuence on this
game, as it has a major stake in the outcome. What are Beijing’s plans? Bei-
jing’s preferences (not yet revealed) might include market specialization
and two international ﬁnancial centers. Doing so would facilitate political
control and improve national security. Its intervention need not be based
on purely economic reasons. Counterfactuals remove any such interaction
but instead freeze economic relationships at a point in time. As such, the
analysis in the chapter biases the results against Shanghai in a way not too
dissimilar to a linear extrapolation.
In light of these criticisms, I am somewhat skeptical with respect to both
the point of the counterfactual exercise and the interpretation given to its
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be huge and that Hong Kong will have a major stake go without saying.
But as economists, I feel our eﬀorts should be focused on understanding
how the ﬁnancial markets will develop and through what mechanisms. Bor-
rowing institutional relationships from the OECD, imposing them on
China, and ﬁxing the relative share of Hong Kong removes the most inter-
esting and important features of ﬁnancial market development in China.
Bringing the historical, political, institutional, and strategic features back
in this discussion would provide a much deeper perspective to what is a de-
liciously complex topic.
Parting Comments
I oﬀer two concluding comments on this thought-provoking chapter.
One, this chapter reminds me that institutional and economic dynamism
represents two of the ﬁnal frontiers in macroeconomic and monetary re-
search. The New Keynesian and new open economy macroeconomics
(NOEM) revolutions have only recently begun to address what has been
the living reality of policy making in emerging markets, particularly those
countries undergoing postsocialist transition. The profession needs to in-
troduce more evolutionary political and institutional mechanisms as well
as evolving economic structure into mainstream research on emerging
markets. In my research work with the ASEAN 3, I am repeatedly struck
by the need for economics to reach back to its intellectual roots in political
economy. We should always reﬂect upon the deep institutional and politi-
cal assumptions that underlie our elegant models. If we were to take a more
holistic approach in emerging markets, then perhaps our record in emerg-
ing markets to date would be more enabling than it has been in the past
thirty years.
Two, I am left mesmerized by the questions of whether Hong Kong will
be able to eﬀectively compete with Shanghai once Shanghai’s gloves are oﬀ
and how Hong Kong will manage their raison d’êtreas a part of the People’s
Republic of China. I simply do not know the answer to either. However, as
a market socialist economy, it is certain that China will continue to direct
its development from Beijing. Time will tell how Hong Kong will ﬁt into
her plans.
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